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. 1

PERCEPTIONS'OF CORPORATE CRIME:
ASSESSING THE SERIOUSNESS
Dale J. Ardovini-Brooker, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1998
Many studies have been done concerning the seriousness of
traditional street crime. There is a need in the field of criminalogy to expand our knowledge about how serious corporate crimes are.
A key feature of seriousness is how researchers measure it. Using a
survey; I analyzed people's perceptions of corporate crime. I had
the respondents indicate the-seriousness of the crime and harm by
using a Likert Scale as well as identifying the appropriate sanction/
sentence for the company convicted of the crime. This proved useful
in attempting to identify how seriousness is measured by the sanc
tions/sentences imposed by the respondents. Utilizing this method,
I found that respondents were more likely to give harsher, more pun
itive sanctions to those corporate crimes involving physical harm.
It was also found that corporate crimes involving environmental harm
were more serious than corporate crimes involving economic harm.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
There is a need in the criminological field of corporate crime

to understand public attitudes toward corporate crime. In an attempt
to gain information about public perceptions of corporate crime, a

survey was designed and administered that included a series of vig
nettes in which corporations had been convicted of crimes and the
consequences of the crime(s) were revealed. The respondents then

gave the sanction(s) that they felt was appropriate given the in

formation. This in turn led to an analysis of the responses given to

try and comprehend the public's perception of the crimes involved in
the survey.

Statement of the Problem
There have been few studies that specifically examine the

perception of white-collar and or corporate crimes. In a number of
studies, some of these crimes are included in a larger study that

measures conventional crimes and their seriousness. Peter Rossi and
Richard Berk, in their bookG::t-��:is�me��;�:'examine both white-

collar and corporate offenses in comparing the public's views and
.______ - �-· ,< .....�--�·-··�

the Federal Guidelines set forth by the U.S. Sentencing Commission
in 1994.

Herbert Edelhertz and Thomas Overcast, in their book
"
A�;;d;f;r� �-��-�-��h,l maintain that the pro
:_��
��-����---�j�;
1

2

blem is that criminologists have done very little research on white
collar crime compared with ordinary crime" (1982, p. 32).

Further

more, research that deals with more specific types of white-collar
crime is also lacking.With the numerous definitions of white-collar
crime, comes the responsibility of crimin�logists to empirically
test attitudes and norms toward them. This is an area that may tell
us about the public's understanding of corporate offenses, how ser
ious they are perceived and what sanctions are perceived as appro
priate.
The Idea of White-Collar and Corporate Crime
There is a distinct difference in the types of crimes com
mitted by corporations (or corporate actors) and criminals on the
street. "White-collar crimes have never been regarded generally by
the community as of the same kind, to be handled in the same way, as
those involving the historic common law crimes" (Vold, 1958, p. 259).
The perception of corporate crime is partially affected by the media

-.. -

'

in the sense that the public is continually
-

- ·

;

--

•

bombarded with conven-

--

tional street crime stories and corporations_dCLavery�hing
in their
----·· power
to
·---··

avoid
bad publicity. According to Conklin (1977),
.. --·••··-------.....__;_

the issue of public norms and attitudes toward business crime
has long formed a central part of the debate over whether
white-collar crime should be considered criminal in the same
way as are such offenses as murder and rape. (p. 16)
There may not be total agreement by the public as to what corporations
do that is illegal.

..

Edwin Sutherland, in his book-Whi'Ee· Collar· Crime;-·stated that
--..

-•--

__/
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"the public does not think of the businessman as a criminal; that is,
the businessman does not fit the stereotype of criminal" (1949, p.
224). It was his assertion that white-collar crimes are viewed from
a different perspective. Most people have a stereotypical view of
the crimfnal as a deeply disturbed individual who is often violent,
of a lower social status, and a minority. This perception was chal
lenged by Sutherland (1949) who developed the idea that crimes occur
on a different level.

White-collar crime was defined as "a crime

committed by a person of respectability and high social status in
the course of his occupation" (p. 9).

This definition has gone

through a long process of development since its beginning.

What

Sutherland examined in his book were the violations committed by
major corporations (which deviated from his original definition of
what white-collar crime was).

He found that "the crimes committed

by these corporations are rational, deliberate, persistent and much
more extensive than prosecution of them indicates" (p. 228).

Al

though Sutherland studied corporations, he was more concerned at
the time with individual actors (social psychological factors) and
not necessarily the corporation as a social actor (that was effected
by larger structural factors such as competition within a capitalist
economy, business cycles, and market pressures).
The concept of corporate crime was formulated out of Suther
land's initial definition of white-collar crime. The 20th century
has seen the development of the corporation and how vital it is to
the capitalist system.

This has guided the current definitions of
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corporate crime. Marshall Clinnard and Richard Quinney (1973) argue
that corporate crime consists of, "offenses committed by corporate
officials for their corporation and the offenses of the corporation
itself" (p. 188). Another definition that is used to view corpora
tions and other organizations (e.g., gove�nment), is proposed by
Laura Schrager and James Short, Jr. (1977) who use the term organ
izational crime. Their definition states that organizational crime
includes,
illegal acts of omission or commission of an individual or a
group of individuals in a legitimate formal organization in
accordance with the operative goals of the organization, which
have a serious physical or economic impact on employees, con
sumers or the general public. (pp. 411-412)
James William Coleman, in his book The Criminal Elite, dis
cusses many traditional white-collar crimes such as embezzlement,
tax evasion, and bribery, but also discusses corporate crimes in
cluding unfair business practices, corporate price fixing, unsafe
production and unsafe products.

qoleman (1994) states that "the

demand to achieve difficult organizational goals is a primary crim
inal motivation" (p. 239). He goes on to acknowledge that corpora
tions may partake in criminal activity to increase profits. When
engaging in illegal activity, the corporation may not be given the
same punishments that traditional criminals are given.

Often, the

corporation is able to resolve their wrongdoings by settling civil
suits and paying minimal fines.
In his book, Trusted Criminals, David Friedrichs (1996) views
corporate crime in two broad categories of corporate violence and
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corporate abuse of power, fraud, or economic exploitation.

Fried

richs states that "corporate violence results from policies and
actions, undertaken on behalf of the corporation, that result in
the exposure of people to harmful conditions, products, or sub
stances" (p. 60).

There are a variety of victims when examining

corporate violence; they include the environment, consumers and
employees. Corporate abuse of power, fraud and economic exploita
tion "has no violent consequences, but rather vast political and
economic consequences" (p. 83).

Friedrichs argues that corporate

actions are a major social problem.

Perceptions or attitudes toward

corporate actions may be effected by how people perceive these ac
tions within a larger framework (who is victimized, what the con
sequences are, and how the corporation could have prevented their
negligent or harmful actions).
Members of society often relate the seriousness of a crime to
its victims or the harm done.

It is easy for the public to under

stand what harm is caused by traditional street crime, since many
people know of someone that has been a victim or have seen media
accounts of such an occurrence.

However, people may fail to under

stand the real costs involved when a corporation-commits an illegal
act. Many people are unfamiliar with the harms that corporations can
inflict.

As Friedrichs (1996) points out, "corporate crime both

represents a substantial threat to the physical well-being of citi
zens, consumers, and workers and is the cause of enormous financial
losses" (p. 95).
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The physical well-being of citizens can be threatened by cor
porations who pollute the environment with toxic waste and release
toxins into the air. •An estimated one-quarter of the United States
population will develop cancer and by some (admittedly controver
sial) estimates 80-90% of all cancers may_be environmentally related•
(Friedrichs, 1996, p. 71). Cancer is not the only medical problem

associated with environmental pollution. Other ailments that may be
the result of pollution include lung disease, heart conditions, and
birth defects, not to mention the destruction of entire eco-systems
(plant life, wildlife).
Consumers are affected by corporations that manufacture un
safe, inadequately tested products in order to maximize their pro
fits. •some 70,000 Americans die annually from product-related ac
cidents, and millions more suffer disabling injuries at a cost of
over $100 billion in property damage, lost wages, insurance, litiga
tion and medical expenses• (Friedrichs, 1996, p. 75). Some of the
products are of course dangerous to begin with, but many companies
are criminally negligent when they fail to concern themselves with
the consumer's safety when using the product.
Workers may be in danger due to their employer's negligence.
Corporations employ thousands of workers who are often subjected to
dangerous work environments. Many accidents occur on the job which
result in people getting injured and even causing death.

Friedrichs

(1996). stated that
various recent studies by,the government and private organiza
tions have estimated the annual deaths from job related di-
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seases ranged from 136,800 to 390,000 and work-related acci
dents have been estimated to cause 10,700 deaths and 1.8 mil
lion disabling injuries annually. (p. 80)
Many of these accidents could have been avoided if employers were as
concerned about their employees as they were about profit goals.
The public is also subject to paying_ for fraud that goes on
when corporations engage in illegal activities to maximize their
profits. As Friedrichs (1996) points out, •corporations with con
tracts to provide goods and services to the government have de
frauded the government of billions; citizens and taxpayers ulti
mately foot the bill for these frauds• (p. 81). Medical fraud has
become a major issue within the last few years. Now, a large portion
of the health care bill is due to fraud. Another activity that in
cludes economic exploitation of the public and or the taxpayer is
price-fixing whereby companies conspire with competitors to inflate
prices and gain profit.
It is important to realize that dealing with corporations is a
much different process than dealing with traditional street crim
inals. As corporations started to grow in size and impact in the
late 19th century, it caused some concern with the public and the
government. There was need to control the operations of these or
ganizations more closely through the creation of special regulatory
agencies. As Kip Schlegel (1980) points out,
at first, these agencies were designated to deal with specific
industries and were generally involved with such concerns as
taxation, utility rates, transportation, interstate commerce,
and banking. However, as corporations began to markedly af
fect the health and safety of the public at large and the
tremendous number of individuals in their employ, special
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regulatory agencies were formed to protect society from harm.
As a consequence, some three dozen federal agencies and volume
upon volume of regulatory laws have been created. (p. 8)
Agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
were all formed in response to activities of corporations that con
cerned the public. The laws used by regulatory agencies have a mod
est burden of proof with no jury, only a judge. It would appear as
though it would be easy to use regulatory laws to control corporate
crime, but as we will examine later, there are other factors in
volved.
The criminal justice system uses agencies like the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S. Postal
Service, the Internal Revenue Service, the Inspectors Generals and
U.S Customs to enforce and investigate crimes committed by com
panies.
cases.

These agencies play a small role in most corporate crime
If a company breaks the law, it can be fined, it can be

placed on probation where different terms may be imposed, it can be
made to go through structural change, it can be made to engage in
community service, and it can be ordered to publicize its crime(s).
Regulatory laws also include such sanctions, but the most commonly
used sanction overall is the fine.
Purpose of and Need for the Study
There has been some debate among criminologists as to how laws
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are created and for what purpose. Two models concerned with the ori
gins of law are the consensus and conflict models.

Shrager and

Short (1980) indicate
disagreement about the significance of white-collar crime
often pits consensus theorists, who seize upon the presumed
moral neutrality of public opinion, against conflict theorists
who respond somewhat defensively that organizations are highly
successful in shaping public opinion. (p. 17)
It is important to extend these models into the framework of not
only how crimes are originated, but how and why they are used, why
they come about and how they are enforced or not enforced and why.
Another area that must be explored concerns the kinds of sanctions
that can arise from law.
From a consensus model approach, law is thought to be a re
flection of the shared social values of a community.

Emile Durkheim

(1933) is often times associated with consensus theory.

It was he

who argued that criminal law stems from the collective conscience:
Everybody knows that there is a social cohesion whose cause
lies in a certain conformity of all particular consciences to
a common type which is none other than the psychic type of
society. Thus, the nature of collective sentiments accounts
for punishment.' Moreover, we see anew that the power of reac
tion which is given over to government functionaries, once
they have made their appearance, is only an emanation of that
which has been diffuse in society since its birth. (pp. 104105)
This collective conscience has developed into the idea that
society's consciousness is embedded in the origin of criminal law.
Wolfgang Friedmann (1964) argues;
the state of criminal law continues to be--as it should--a
decisive reflection of the social consciousness of a society.
What kind of conduct an organized community considers, at a
given time, sufficiently condemnable to impose official sane-
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tions, is a barometer of the moral and social thinking of a
community. (p. 143)
These sanctions, as Friedmann alludes to, are intricate parts of
criminal law. It is believed that bonds within the community are
strengthened by a deviant act that has happened (Sheley, 1995).

A

common enemy also may be apparent, thereby producing unity in re
sponse to it, in the form of rating seriousness and imposing appro
priate sanctions.

Thomas, Cage, and Foster (1976) examined the

consensus model and suggest that
criminal law is essentially a codification of values of a peo
ple that may be viewed as legitimate because it reflects high
levels of agreement on both what constitutes a criminal of
fense and the magnitude of formal legal sanctions that may be
imposed on those who violate the law. (p. 110)
This magnitude may be reflected in the types of sanctions that peo
ple feel are appropriate given the harm or impact of a crime.

Even

if the public feels that certain sanctions are appropriate, this
does not mean they will be enforced.
punishment.

A good example is capital

Many people may feel that this sanction is appropriate,

but they may live in a state where it is not a form of punishment.
In regards to corporate crime, regulatory laws were established to

--

control companies, but the sanctions given may not be the ones that
the public feel is appropriate.

Statutory laws may not be used as

often as the public would want to punish companies.
Conflict theorists would argue that definitions of crime are
subject to change. This theory of criminal law, the Marxist view in
particular rivals the consensus theory. This model of criminal law
has been supported by Richard Quinney (1970), who has stated, •con-
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rary to conventional belief, law is a tool of the ruling class pro
viding the mechanism for forcefully (and sometimes violently)
controlling the rest of the population• (p. 285).

If something is

believed to be criminal or deviant, there is an underlying reason
for that definition.

Law is used as an instrument by powerful

groups in society to dominate and control.

Corporations are power

ful and have a great deal of economic and political influence.
These influences may be part of how laws are originated in the
first place.

Chambliss and Seidman (1971) argue,

Sociologically, what constitutes right and wrong behavior can
be discovered only by examining, not some presumed society
wide moral code, but the decision-making processes in the so
ciety which determine what activity is to be made criminal.
(p. 72)
Those who make laws may not be as concerned as the public about cer
tain types of crimes.

The decisions that are made about the crea

tion of laws may be initially influenced by a public outcry, but
what happens to the law after it passes is another set of processes
which can be influenced by special interests of law makers.

These

special interests may involve shielding companies who support law
makers.

Just because a law has been put into effect does not mean

it will be enforced, or that convictions will result or that appro
priate sanctions will be imposed.
Even though there have been studies that measure the public's
perception of corporate and white-collar crime, there has not been,
to my knowledge, a study addressing only corporate offenses com
mitted by the organization.

With the amount of damage a corporation
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can inflict on consumers, the environment or its employees, it is
important to see how people will perceive this type of criminal of
fense.
tion.

People may not be familiar with harms caused by a corpora
This can lead to the •widespread view that the public is

condoning, indifferent, or ambivalent• tow�rd corporate crime (Au
bert, 1952, p. 265).

This view was envisioned by E.A. Ross in 1907

who said the acts of •criminaloids• were not under the •effective
ban of public opinion• and that their behavior was •not stigmatized
by the public, the press, or the government in the same way as tra
ditional crime• (1907, pp. 69-70).

Ross goes on to suggest that the

•backwardness of public opinion• might nullify the effect of law;
with public morality lagging behind legislation, corporate offenders
would have more opportunity to prey on the public {p. 70).
I hope to obtain an understanding of what people (for this
study: college students in an advanced criminology class, two prin
ciples of sociology classes and two introduction to criminal justice
classes) would do if they were the judge or jury in the case of a
corporation convicted of a crime.

Much of the literature has fo

cused on seriousness of offenses using a Likert scale, but there is
no clarity as to what the seriousness is.

Each individual may have

a different idea of what it means to be the most serious offense.
To understand the seriousness of a crime there is a need to define
what it means.

This leads to examining what sanctions are imposed

the most, if people were given the opportunity to act as judge and
jury.

•consensus on crime seriousness may reflect an underlying
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normative structure• (Miethe, 1982, p. 516).

In studying what san

ctions respondents think should be applied to corporations, the same
underlying normative structure may be found.

A survey can contri

bute "greatly to our understanding of white-collar crime because
we still have much to learn about patterns of involvement, .ration
alizations, and attitudes pertaining to white collar crime issues"
(Friedrichs, 1996, p. 44).

Examining this issue is of great impor

tance to the field of criminology due to the lack of research ex
ploring people's perceptions of corporate crime.

More specifically

there is a lack of research concerning the public's perceptions
about environmental crimes committed by organizations.
Design
Research Questions
The purpose of this study is to explore people's perceptions
of corporate crimes. The research questions of the study are:
1.

What types of sentences are specified by the respondent?

2.

What types of sentences are most commonly used by respon

dents in sentencing the corporation?
3.

Which types of corporate crimes receive the harshest sen

tences from respondents?
4.

What corporate crimes are ranked as being the most ser

5.

What are the possible reasons (within the vignette) for

ious?
these sentences?
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6.

How else can we measure the seriousness of an offense?

Methodology
Measuring perceptions and attitudes about corporate crimes is
done using results from survey research.

The survey contains seven

vignettes, each describing a corporation that has been convicted of
a crime and the consequences of that crime.

The vignettes contain

crimes that have been depicted in other studies as well as ones that
are based on actual crimes although the harm done may not be the
same.

Vignettes 1, 4, 6 are based on Rossi and Berk (1997).

Vig

nette 2 was used in Rossi, Waite, Bose, and Berk, R. E. (1974), and
is being replicated in this study.

Vignette 3 is based on a similar

offense in Rossi et al. (1974) which described, manufacturing and
selling drugs known to be harmful to users.

Vignette 5 is also

based on an offense from Rossi et al. (1974) which stated, "manu
facturing and selling autos known to be dangerously defective" (p.
10).

Vignette 7 is based on a case that is currently ongoing with

the Federal Bureau of Investigation where a company has been accused
of overbilling Medicare billions of dollars.

The survey instructed

the respondent to read the vignette and then respond to it by choos
ing an appropriate sentence for the corporation.

They were able to

choose from (a) a fine (if the respondent chooses this, he/she will
need to specify a dollar amount); (b) probation (if the respondent
chooses this, he/she will need to specify the amount of time in
months); or (c) other (the respondent was asked to specify what type
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of sanction should be imposed on the corporation other than a fine
or probation).
Along with the responses to each vignette, the respondents
were asked to rank the crimes in order of seriousness with •1• being
the most serious through •7• which denotes_the least serious of the
crimes.

The reveal the seriousness of the offenses as seen by the

respondents.

The data collected from the survey will provide per

ceptions about how people would sentence a corporation that has
been convicted of a specific type of corporate crime.

Demographic

information was obtained from each of the respondents. This included
questions about their sex, year in school, race/ethnicity, age on
their last birthday, total family income for the last year before
taxes, major, and intended occupation upon completion of their de
gree.

This data was not analyzed in this study, but remains for

future research purposes.
Operationalization of Variables
The independent variable in the study is the vignette that is
presented to the respondent.

The vignette contains a description

about a crime that has been committed by a corporation and it will
also have the consequences or victims of that particular crime (this
included people getting sick, the air being polluted, causing death,
people suffering injuries, and economic loss).

The sentence that

the respondent gives to a particular vignette is the dependent vari
able.

This allows for the exploration of respondent's attitudes to-
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wards a corporation committing a crime by examining the sentences
that are given.

Along with this, respondents were asked to rank the

vignettes as to their seriousness.

This will clarify which crimes

the respondents perceive as the most serious.
Sample
The sample of this study included one section of Advanced
Criminology, two sections of Principles of Sociology and two sec
tions of Introduction to Criminal Justice taught at Western Michigan
University in the winter semester of 1998.
respondents.

The sample included 194

The reason why this sample is being used is because it

is convenient and accessible.

The survey was administered to all of

the students that wished to participate in the study.

The students

were told that the survey is voluntary and will be kept confidential.
Data Gathering Method
Once the survey instrument was developed, completed and re
viewed by the committee for content and clarity, it was sent to the
Human Subject Institutional Review Board (HSIRB) for authorization.
The administration of the survey took place when approval had been
given by the instructor of the class to do so.
handed out to each student in the class.
about the nature of the survey.

The same survey was

Students were informed

The respondents were instructed to

read through the survey and then begin the questionnaire.
were responded to.

Completed surveys were then collected.

Questions
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Ethical Considerations
The survey was completely voluntary for the students.

They

were reassured that there would not be any consequences if they
chose not to participate (due to the fact that it is in a classroom
setting and may be perceived as being part.of the grade for the
class).

The intent and purposes of the study were reviewed with

the students.

They were assured that their answers would be kept

confidential.

If they did not want to answer certain questions then

they did not have to.

The students' names were not used.

The sur

veys have identification numbers on them, but only for data entering
purposes.

The students read the front page of the survey which in

formed them that by handing in the survey, this was their consent to
use the information provided by them.

It also told them that there

might be unforeseen risks to participants.

The consent form also

stated that if there were any questions or concerns regarding the
survey, they could contact the researcher (the phone number was
provided), the Human Subject Institutional Review Board (HSIRB, the
phone number was provided), or the Office of the Vice President of
Research (this phone number was also provided).
Data Analysis
Frequencies of the sentence options were used to determine
which ones were imposed most often for the seven vignettes (fine,
probation, or other).

Each vignette was analyzed separately as well

to see which sentence option was imposed most often for the corpor-
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ate crime involved.

To find out which sentences receive the harsh

est sentences, the mean and median of the fine amount in dollars and
probation length in months was determined for each of the vignettes.
The open-ended option that allows a person to specify the type of
sanction was analyzed as well to see what other types of sentences
are perceived as just for the corporation in the vignette.

Anal

ysis of the open-ended responses (other) also provided insight into
the harshness of the sentence given.

To determine ranked serious

ness of the seven vignettes, the mean rank for each vignette was
calculated to determine which of the vignettes were seen as most
serious and least serious.
Reliability
Six of the vignettes that were used in the survey have been
used in a previous studies by Rossi et al. (1974) and Rossi and Berk
(1997). This survey is designed around seven specific vignettes with
specific harms.
survey.

I was responsible for administering and coding the

The construction of the survey was such that clear instruc

tions were given to the respondent, thereby increasing the reliability.
Validity
I was assisted in the design of the survey by my thesis com
mittee. This workgroup tested the survey for validity, clarity, and
substance to ensure that it was administered in the best way pos-
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sible.

Respondents were allowed to answer open-ended questions with

specific sanctions that should be imposed on the corporation.

If

answers seemed to be unreasonable, I consulted with my committee to
decide on whether they should be allowed to be part of the data to
be analyzed.

Ranking the offenses will validate the perception of

the respondents, since there may be difficulty discerning what sen
tences are the more serious ones.
Limitations to the Study
There are several limitations to this study that can affect
the outcome and generalizability.

First, the surveys will be ad

ministered to one Advanced Criminology class, two Principles of
Sociology classes and two Introduction to Criminal Justice classes
at Western Michigan University.

It is not possible to generalize

about an entire population (the United States public, or the stu
dents at Western Michigan University) and what their perceptions are
of corporate crime by analyzing this sample.

Second, the age of the

sample may play a role in the perception of corporate crime.

Since

many people do not have direct knowledge about corporate wrongdoing
and its intricacies, it may be difficult to decide on a sentence for
the corporation.

This is particularly difficult when people fail to

realize that corporations can be held criminally liable for their
actions.

Third, the vignettes only include seven corporate crimes;

this is only a small sample of what corporations have been and could
be convicted of in a court of law.

Fourth, the corporations are as-
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sumed to have been already put on trial and convicted of the offense
that is stated in the vignette.

This fails to take into considera

tion that there may be other information about the crime, the cor
poration and its' consequences that may be heard by a judge and
jury.

Fifth, the decisions that respondents make are abstract, they

do not consider the constraints of carrying out the sentences (im
plementing probation within the corporation, collecting the fines).
Lastly, the respondents' perceptions of corporate crime are measured
in regards to the vignettes, but may be affected by other variables
not included in this study.
- Outline of Thesis
Chapter II of this thesis provides a review of the related
literature.

This review includes sections on the idea of white

collar and corporate crime, public perceptions of crime and punish
ment and public perceptions of white-collar and corporate crimes.
Chapter III consists of the findings from the survey.

Chapter IV

includes a discussion and interpretations of the findings.

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Public Perceptions of Crime and Punishment
Many studies includ� white-collar or corporate crimes along
with conventional street crimes when examining public perceptions.
The focus of these studies is not white-collar or corporate crimes
in particular, but usually the condemnation of an array of crimes by
the public.

In Don Gibbons' study, •crime and Punishment: A Study

In Social Attitudes•, the degree of punishment given to specific
crimes is the focus (1969).

Respondents indicated which sanction

was appropriate for a specific crime.

A major finding was that,

•distribution of responses shows some variability among citizens in
their views about the penalty to fit the crime• (p. 395).

The var

iability in the sanctions handed down by the respondents may be
understood in the sentencing practices of the criminal justice sys
tem that also has a degree of variability.

Out of the twenty crimes

the respondents had to decide on, only four could have been consid
ered white-collar.

Within these four, only two could be considered

as being a corporate action that the corporation was ultimately
responsible and could be held criminally liable for.

In these of

fenses, •the penalty preferences of many citizens were harsher than

were actually handed out by the court• (p. 397). This may indicate
that the public has a get tough attitude towards corporations.
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Rossi et al. (1974) studied the perceived seriousness of 140
offenses.

They suggest that, •the seriousness of a criminal act may

be viewed as a normative evaluation, an overall judgement which al
lows comparison among criminal acts, cultural values in different
societies and cultures, and individual value differences• (p. 224).
Rossi et al. asked respondents to judge the seriousness of 140 of
fenses by asking them to indicate a •9• if the offense was among the
most serious and a •1• for the offense being one of the least ser
ious.
Of the 140 offenses, there were fifteen that could be consid
ered corporate or organizational offenses.

They were, •manufactur

ing and selling drugs known to be harmful to users,• •knowingly sel
ling contaminated food which results in a death,• •causing the death
of an employee by neglecting to repair machinery,• •causing the
death of a tenant by neglecting to repair heating plant,• •manufac
turing and selling autos known to be dangerously defective,• •know
ingly selling defective used cars as completely safe,• •knowingly
selling worthless stocks as valuable investments,• •lending money at
illegal interest rates,• •overcharging on repairs to automobiles,•
•overcharging for credit in selling goods,• •knowingly using inac
curate scales in weighing meat for sale,• •refusal to make essential
repairs to rental property,• •fixing prices of a consumer product
like gasoline,• •fixing prices of machines sold to businesses,• and
•false advertising of headache remedy• (Rossi et al. 1974, pp. 228229).

They were ranked 25th, 26th, 51st, 57th, 63rd, 79th, 90th,
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97th, 110th, 116th, 121st, 122nd, 126th, 127th and 132nd (out of
140) respectably.
The first two fall between •assault with a gun on a stranger•
(24th) and •armed robbery of a payroll company• (27th) (p. 228).
Causing the death of an employee falls bet�een •father-daughter in
cest• (50th) and •breaking and entering a bank• (52nd) (p. 228).
Causing the death of a tenant falls between •mugging and stealing
$200• (56th) and •killing spouse's lover after catching them to
gether• (58th) (p. 228).

The defective auto falls between •for

cible rape of a former spouse• (62nd) and •beating up a stranger•
(64th) (p. 229).

The selling of defective used cars falls between

•theft of a car for resale• (78th) and •burglary of an appliance
store stealing several TV sets• (80th) (p. 229).

The offense of

selling worthless stocks falls between •brother-sister incest•
(89th) and •beating up a spouse• (91st) (p. 229).

Lending money at

illegal interest rates falls between •joining a riot• (96th) and
•knowingly buying stolen goods• (98th) (p. 229).

Overcharging on

repairs to autos falls between •proposing homosexual practices to an
adult• (109th) and •shoplifting a dress from a department store•
(111th) (p. 229).

Overcharging for credit falls between •shoplift

ing a pair of shoes from a shoe store• (115th) and •shoplifting a
carton of cigarettes from a supermarket• (117th) (p. 229).

Knowing

ly using inaccurate scales and refusal to make essential repairs
fall between •false claims of dependents on income tax return•
(120th) and •engaging in male homosexual acts with consenting
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adults• (123rd) (p. 229).

The •price fixing• offenses fall be

tween •breaking a plate glass window in a shop• (125th) and •sell
ing pornographic magazines• (128th).

False advertising of a head

ache remedy falls between •joining a prohibited demonstration•
(131st) and •refusal to pay alimony• (133rd) (p. 229).
Rossi et al. fail to give the victims (if any) in the •harm
ful drugs,• •defective auto,• •defective used autos,• •worthless
stocks,• •lending money at illegal rates,• •overcharging on repairs
and for credit,• inaccurate scales,• •refusal to make essential
repairs,• •price fixing• and •false advertising• offenses.

This

inconsistency may have led to the lower seriousness ranking that
they received.

If we examine these offenses in terms of the harms

that they have the potential of causing then we can view them in two
distinct categories; physical harm and economic harm.

The offenses

that can be considered as physical include those that may hurt or
inflict physical harm on a person or persons.

In the offense de

scribed as •knowingly selling contaminated food which results in
death• (ranked 26th) we can plainly see the physical harm is death.
Rossi et al. fail to clearly state the harm done for all of the
offenses.

The offense described as •manufacturing and selling goods

known to be harmful to users• ranked the highest of the organiza
tional crimes (25th) provides no clear indication of the physical
harm.

The respondent can only guess what happened to the users.

There is indeed potential for harm to be done, but in order to as
sess an offense more effectively, there needs to be more informa-
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tion about the harm done by the offense.
The harms are even more vague in the description of economic,
offenses.

The offenses ranked 90th, 97th, 110th, 116th, 121st,

122nd, 126th, 127th, and 132nd are all examples of economic harm
crimes.

There is no mention in any of the offenses as to how much

money was lost or how much it cost the consumers.

One other point

is that Rossi et al. fails to include offenses that deal with pollu
tion or other environmental violations (which corporations are often
found criminally liable for).

They conclude that •white-collar

crimes and victimless crimes were not seen as serious by the re
spondents• {p. 233).

Even though •seriousness• was not specified by

Rossi and his colleagues, respondents in the study produced some de
gree of consensus as to what it meant.

This is true especially when

we view the crimes in terms of the harms that were caused or could
have been caused.

It must be noted that all of the physical harm

offenses (the ones ranked 25th, 26th, 51st, 57th, 63rd, and 79th)
were ranked higher in terms of seriousness than the economic harm
offenses (the ones ranked 90th, 97th, 110th, 116th, 121st, 122nd,
126th, 127th, and 132nd).
In another major study conducted by Rossi and Berk (1997),
people were surveyed to see what their sentencing preference would
be for a range of federal crimes.

They used a series of vignettes

that described a crime, the offender involved, and what the outcome
of the crime was in terms of dollar amount lost or physical harm
done.

Respondents were asked to select a punishment for the vig-
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nette.

They could choose from probation, prison or a death sen

tence.

They were also asked to determine a length of the prison

sentence.

There were five major crimes examined that fell into

the corporate crime category.

The only crime not examined by Rossi

and Berk (1997) that is common in other studies is selling unsafe
automobiles that can cause harm to the consumer.
Rossi and Berk found that •when injuries result from corporate
food and drug violations, sentences were enhanced by substantively
large amounts• (1997, p. 136).

Here is a point that seems crucial

to public perception: victimization and physical harm.

When victims

are involved and physical harm occurs, the public seems to react
more severely according to Rossi and Berk.

They point out that

•respondents were more concerned when concrete consequences were
specified• (p. 140).

This is a key element that seems to be lack

ing in their earlier study.

They clearly have identified numerous

factors within the vignettes that deal with the harm involved with
the offenses.

This can be seen by such vignettes that include the

following harms; •the local habitats for native plants and animals
were destroyed', •at least one death occurred•, and •the public was
overcharged $500,000• (pp. 221-222).

Corporate crime has many vic

tims and this could effect public attitudes towards it.

However,

Rossi and Berk also note that, •perhaps corporate actors are given
the benefit of the doubt, because their only real crime is an over
zealous pursuit for profit• (p. 140).
M. Levi and S. Jones, in their study, •Public and Police

27
Perceptions of Crime seriousness in England and Wales,• found that
while there is little difference between police and public views on
the overall rank order seriousness of each offense, there were lower
police scores for fraud (1985, p. 239).

Fraud, may be viewed as a

white-collar type offense and may receive� lower score due to its
lack of physical harm to the public.

Levi and Jones believe that

the lower scores •may indicate that fraud is seen to be outside the
mainstream 'action-oriented' police subculture, noted as a central
aspect of police self-concept by all researchers in Britain and
America• (p. 242).

When studying different groups it is helpful to

know the position of their occupation or education and how it may or
may not relate to their perception of crime.

In the case of cor

porate crime, the police may have no idea what goes on since they
are so consumed with combating traditional street crimes.
Public Perceptions of White-Collar and Corporate Crime
Donald Newman (1957) studied how citizens reacted to food
violations that were considered to be a type of white-collar crime
(at this point, these types of violations were not considered to be
•corporate• or •organizational• crimes) in his article, •Public
Attitudes Toward a Form of White Collar Crime.• The people surveyed
were asked to respond to cases that came from the federal district
attorney in which a corporation was convicted of a food law viola
tion.

The case included the company's history of convictions (if

the offense was the company's first or whether they had been con-

28
victed previously).

Newman found that 78% of his respondents felt

that the penalties should have been more severe than the actual
court decision (p. 230).

In the study, the respondent was asked to

provide the sentence that they believed to be appropriate for the
offense.

•Fines, warnings, seizure of the product, and jail terms,

in various combinations were the most popular responses• (p. 231).
The idea that the public views these crimes as a social problem sug
gests that there is a need to examine other types of corporate
crimes, as well.

Newman also addresses the importance of attitudes

and their use as a •guide to enforcement of present laws and to pos
sible changes in future legislation• (p. 232).
Reed and Reed (1975) examined attitudes toward white-collar
offenders as a general category based on questionnaires filled out
by college students at a southern university.

The survey found that

knowledge of white-collar crime was limited: only 42% of the sample
read or heard about white collar crime and only 32% could give an
adequate definition of the term.

The popular image of the white

collar criminal was a •rather innocuous figure• who was •educated,
neat, male, white and married;• however, he was also •dishonest,
ambitious, intelligent, greedy, and aggressive• (Reed & Reed, 1975,
p. 282).

When asked what the students feared the most about white

collar crime, they referred to being cheated, embarrassed, or phy
sically harmed; however, only 40% gave such responses, the rest be
ing uncertain about the consequences of the crimes (Reed & Reed,
1975).

When asked to recommend criminal penalties for white-collar
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offenders, students usually preferred suspended sentences, proba
tion, fines or short prison terms.

A point that is noteworthy is

that there may be a smaller social distance between the student
respondent and the white-collar offender than between the respondent
and a conventional criminal.

This may effect their perceptions and

attitudes towards white-collar offenders and conventional street
criminals.
Frank, Cullen, Travis III, and Borntrager (1989) examined the
conditions under which "business executives and the public embrace
the use of civil or criminal sanctions against either company execu
tives or the corporate entity itself" (p. 141).

They use a series

of vignettes that describe incidents of potential corporate crime.
The major limitation to these vignettes is that they all contain
possible crimes involving defective automobiles.
type of corporate crime considered.

This is the only

The purpose of the analysis was

"to examine how support for the imposition of sanctions would differ
according to the level of culpability and harm a specific act in
volved" (p. 144).

The vignettes include information as to the per

son's role within the company in deciding on the defective auto.
They also include physical and economic harms that were caused by
the defective auto.

The respondents were asked in each vignette to

apply a civil or criminal penalty on the individual and/or corpor
ation using a Likert scale for punitiveness preference.

•The re

spondents generally showed a strong willingness to hold the cor
porate entity civilly responsible in all of the vignettes presented•
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126th an 127th, in Cullen et al. (1982) they are ranked 96th and
97th. •Knowingly selling defective used cars as completely safe•
increased from 79th to 40th to 41st.

Another increase in the ranked

seriousness was for the offense of •causing the death of an employee
by neglecting to repair machinery•, which �as ranked 51st by Rossi
et al. (1974) and in Cullen et al. (1982) is ranked 24th.

There was

an increase in rank of seriousness for the offense of •knowingly
selling contaminated food which results in death• from 26th to 13th.
•causing the death of tenant• which was ranked 57th in Rossi et al.
(1974) jumped to 51st in Cullen et al. (1982).

The 90th ranked of

fense in Rossi et al. (1974) •knowingly selling worthless stock•
moved up to 78th in this study.

The offense of •lending money at

illegal interest rates• went from 97th to 94th.
repairs• dropped from 110th to 116th.

•Overcharging on

•The offense of •manufactur

ing and selling autos known to be dangerously defective• ranked 63rd
to 40th to 41st.

•Overcharging for credit in selling goods• went

from 116th to 100th.

•Knowingly using inaccurate scales• ranked

121st in Rossi et al. (1974) went to a rank of 99th for this study.
The 122nd ranked offense in Rossi et al. (1974), •refusal to make
repairs• went to 109th for this study.
et al. (1974) went to 114th.

The 132nd-offense in Rossi

It is interesting to note that this

jump in seriousness could possibly be attributed to the Ford Pinto
case that was highly publicized in the late 70s.
drop in rank of seriousness was the offense of

One offense to
•manufacturing and

selling drugs known to be harmful to users• which was 25th in Rossi
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(p. 148).

Other results of the study showed that civil sanctions

increased as economic and physical harm went up, executives (when
,compared with the public) were consistently less willing to impose
sanctions, and legally sanctioning corporations earned widespread
public support in situations where there was direct victimization.
This study also tackled the issue of the culpability of the
corporation.

They included three levels of culpability; knowingly,

recklessly and negligently.

They deliberately leave out the idea of

intentionally due to the fact that when an organization commits an
offense it is in the process of doing business and it is hard to
prove a company would intentionally harm a consumer or worker.

This

study, despite its limitations, shows that the public is willing to
hold corporations criminally liable for their actions.
Cullen, Link and Polanzi (1982) replicate the survey conducted
by Rossi et al. (1974) to see if the growing attention given to
white-collar crime(s) in the late 70s and early 80s has changed peo
ple's perceptions.

Cullen et al. (1982) believe that changes in

politics (Watergate) and increased media attention may have contri
buted to an increased awareness about the problem of white-collar
crime and therefore changed perceptions and attitudes.

The fifteen

offenses that were considered to be corporate offenses in the Rossi
et al. study were reconsidered in this study.
The fifteen offenses did change drastically in their rankings
in this.

The price fixing offenses increased a great deal in terms

of ranked seriousness.

In Rossi et al. (1974), the two were ranked
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et al. (1974) and is ranked 26th in Cullen et al. (1982).

The only

other offense that dropped in rank was the offense of •overcharging
on repairs to autos•, ranked 110th in 1974 and 116th in 1982.

Once

again in this study the physical harm offenses (ranked 13th, 24th,
26th, 40th, 41st, and 51st) were higher th�n the economic harm of
fenses (ranked 78th, 94th, 96th, 97th, 99th, 100th, 109th, 114th to
115th, and 116th).

We do begin to see that there is some form of

consensus between these two samples in Rossi et al. (1974) and Cul
len et al. (1982) in terms of seriousness scores for the two types
of offenses.
Cullen, et al. (1982) argue that white-collar crime is not a
concrete definition and cannot be studied as such:
The violations that have traditionally been grouped under this
offense category often have little in common with one another
--ranging, for instance, from an individual's evasion of in
come tax to a corporate decision to market defective automo
biles. In this light, it is problematic whether a complete
understanding of public attitudes toward white-collar crime
can be reached unless we dissect the concept of white-collar
crime to see how seriousness ratings might vary for different
violations within this general category. (p. 96)
There is a need to break down the category of white-collar
crime into different violations and this is what the researcher has
attempted to do by extracting the fifteen offenses-.that are believed
to fit into the corporate crime typology.

Cullen et al. (1982) con

clude •white-collar crime has increased in seriousness more than any
other category, but it is still viewed as less serious than most
other forms of illegality• (p. 83).
McCleary et al. (1981) also recreate the Rossi et al. (1974)
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study and apply it to criminal justice bureaucrats, including judges,
prosecutors, public defenders and probation officers.

They felt

that •criminal justice bureaucrats perceive seriousness in terms of
many dimensions• instead of •relative terms• taking into considera
tion •loss of life, the degree of medical �ttention required by the
victim, the use of force/intimidation, and the amount of money lost
in the crime• (p. 276).

The following offenses increased in terms

of seriousness; •food contamination,• •defective automobiles,• and
all economic harm offenses.

The three offenses to drop in the rank

ing of seriousness were •manufacturing and selling drugs known to
be harmful to users,• (went from 25th to 32nd), •causing the death
of an employee by neglecting to repair machinery• (went from 51st to
63rd) and •causing the death of a tenant• (went from 57th to 58th).
In this study the seriousness rankings are also similar to the pre
vious studies in that the physical harm offenses are ranked more ser
ious than the economic harm offenses.

Although McCleary and his

colleagues were concerned with the legal education and work exper
ience of their sample, the study provides even more information as
to how corporate crimes and harms are perceived.
Schrager and Short (1980), reexamines the Rossi et al. (1974)
data on public evaluation of the seriousness of white-collar crimes.
In particular, they looked at the economic and physical offense rat
ings as well as those which had potential physical impact.

•The

hypothesis that individuals consider organizational crimes with phy
sical impact to be more serious than those with economic impact is
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consistently supported• (p. 21).

It is apparent from this reexam

ination of the Rossi et al. (1974) study as well as McCleary et al.
(1981) and Cullen et al. (1982) studies that physical harm weighed
more heavily on the minds of the respondents than economic harm.
•Individuals not only consider organizational crimes with physical
impact to be far more serious than those with economic impact, but
they also rate physical organizational crimes as equal in serious
ness to a range of common crimes which theorists consider central to
the •crime problem• (p. 26).

The impact of the crime is an impor

tant factor when assessing seriousness and perceptions of a crime.
Schrager and Short go on to conclude that •there should be strong
support for the goals of agencies such as the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency and
the Consumer Product Safety Commission agencies, which are particu
larly concerned with reducing the physical consequences of organ
izational activity• (p. 28).
This study brings to light the fact that organizational crimes
are not always handled by the law in the same manner, but public
perception dictates that there be some sort of discussion of legal
processing, legal definitions and public opinion to effectively deal
with these types of crimes.

It seems to be clear from the research

that it is not the influence of the corporations that shapes public
opinion, but rather it is the nature and consequences of the crime
itself.
Cullen, Mathers, Clark and Cullen (1983) conducted surveys in
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which they tried to provide information •on the extent to which the
general public would favor the use of a criminal sanction in the
control of white collar crime• (p. 482).

They found that few white

collar violations are "considered to be as serious as street crimes
characterized by direct personal violence" (p. 486).

In their sur

vey, they examined the way in which the public agreed with state
ments that were made regarding white-collar crimes and offenders.
Approximately 90% of their respondents felt that "white-collar crim
inals were treated too leniently and deserve to be sent to jail for
their crimes just like everyone else" (p. 488).

Examining how the

public views criminal sanctions in response to white-collar crimes,
Cullen, et al. also point to the idea that if the public knew the
extent of violent corporate actions, •the levels of punitiveness
might become even more pronounced• (p. 488).

The public may not be

completely aware of the extent to which corporations cause harm.
Miller, Rossi and Simpson (1991) attempt to measure perceptions
of appropriate punishments for offenders convicted of various crimes
committed under differing circumstances.

They •expect to find that

survey respondents think corporate offenders deserve harsher crim
inal punishments than do individual offenders• (p;-397).

Miller et

al. used fifty different vignettes describing criminal acts, offend
ers and the harm resulting from the crimes in each booklet that was
given to the sample.

The respondents were to respond to the sen

tence that was given in each vignette by marking an •x• on a rating
line indicating the degree to which the criminal sanction meted out
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for the incident described (was it too lenient, about right or too
harsh) (Miller et al., 1991).

Miller et al. concluded that for

corporations that committed crimes, the sample survey respondents
called for more punishment than for individual offenders.

•we argue

that, from society's point of view, corporate offenders deserve more
punishment than individual criminal offenders• (Miller et al., 1991,
p. 413).

The main focus of the corporate crime was the offense of

tax evasion; this was included in all of the vignette booklets�

The

study did examine other corporate crimes such as price fixing, mak
ing and selling pharmaceutical products known to be harmful to
users, and selling cars known to be dangerous, but results from
these were not reported on.
V. Lee Hamilton and Joseph Sanders also look at corporate
crime and public attitudes in their study, •corporate Crime through
Citizens' Eyes: Stratification and Responsibility in the United
States, Russia, and Japan• (1996). They focus on offenses that occur
while a person is carrying out a job within an organizational set
ting (a corporation).

The research focused on •how individuals'

places in the social stratification system can affect judgements•
(p. 514).

Hamilton and Sanders measure responsibility and avoid

ability of the corporate offender in their survey.

They hypothesize

that leniency is given to corporate actors by those who share sim
ilar group characteristics with them such as income and education
(p. 541).

However, in their findings, there was only an •indirect

impact on responsibility judgments via its' effects on sociolegally
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related attitudes• (p. 541).

Hamilton and Sanders bring up a key

issue in the understanding of public perceptions of corporate wrong
doing: the respondent's social status (whether it be income, educa
tion, occupation, etc.) may effect the way in which they perceive
the offense.
This research will use different aspects of these studies to
study public attitudes towards corporate crimes and how the public
would like to punish the corporation.

The intention is to combine

some of the measurements of public perceptions and attitudes that
other social scientists have used to try and understand how people
view a certain number of corporate crimes.

Many questions still re

main about the public's attitudes, but hopefully this study will
capture one aspect that can be helpful in developing future research
in this area.

CHAPTER III
FINDINGS
Seriousness Scores
Table 1 entitled •Mean Seriousness of Vignettes in Rank Order•
shows the average ratings received for each one of the vignettes if
we were to rank the mean seriousness from •most serious• to •least
serious.•
Table 1
Mean Seriousness of Vignettes in Rank Order
Rank Vignette

Mean Seriousness
(Valid N)

Harm/Impact

1

Vignette 3

Physical

6.59
(193)

2

Vignette 2

Physical

6.19
(193)

3

Vignette 1

Environmental

6.07
(194)

4

Vignette 6

Environmental

5

Vignette 5

Physical

5.80
(194)

6

Vignette 7

Economic

5.26
(190)

7

Vignette 4

Economic

4.34
(192)
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5.96
(190)
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Table 1 does not really produce any surprises in terms of the
crimes and their seriousness as perceived by the respondents.

The

two most serious offenses were those that included the deaths of
people (physical harm); Vignettes 3 and 2 are ranked 1st and 2nd
respectfully.

In Vignette 3, the company was responsible for the

deaths of four people because it knowingly sold unsafe, improperly
tested pharmaceutical devices.

In Vignette 2, the company was

responsible for an employee's death because it was negligent in
repairing machinery.

The other vignette (5) that includes physical

harm is ranked 5th; this is the vignette in which twenty people suf
fered serious injuries when they were driving a new truck that was
not tested properly by the company.

The two crimes involving en

vironmental harm come after the physical harm crimes that involve
death, but before the physical harm crime that involved serious in
juries to twenty people.

Vignette 1 (ranked 3rd), involves the

pollution of local streams and lakes rendering the drinking water
unsafe.

In Vignette 6 (ranked 4th), the company is responsible for

destroying local habitats of plants and animals.

The least serious

of the Vignettes 7 and 4 (ranked 6th and 7th respectively), were
ones that involved economic harm when the companies overcharged the
government.

Vignette 7 involved a company overcharging the govern

ment $1 billion by knowingly overbilling Medicare.

Vignette 4 in

volved a company overcharging the government $1 million by knowingly
rigging the bids with competitors.
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Assigning Sanctions
Seriousness is only one way in which to measure how a crime is
perceived by people.

The other way that was used to understand peo

ple's perceptions about corporate crimes was by having the respond
ents indicate the sanction that they felt would be appropriate for
the crime. In doing so, the respondents could choose any combination
of the following: Fine, Probation and Other.

If Fine was chosen,

the respondent was then asked to specify a value in U.S. dollars.
If Probation was chosen the respondents were asked to put how many
months would be appropriate.

If the respondents chose Other, they

were asked to specify the sanction that they would place upon the
company.

By having the respondents do this, we can begin to under

stand more clearly how serious the crimes were perceived.

The more

punitive the sanction the more serious the crime was perceived by
the respondents.
The Fine Sanction
I found that the most common sanction selected by respondents
was a fine.

In Table 2, the percentages ranged from 67% to 89.2%

indicating a fine was an appropriate sanction for the crime.

Both

of the vignettes that included economic harm (4 and 7) had over 80%
of the respondents assigning a fine sanction to them. Vignette 7
had 84.0% of respondents (163) indicate that they would assign a
fine as a sanction. Vignette 4 had 81.4% of respondents indicate
that a fine was appropriate for the crime and harm done.

The fine
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sanction was used by over 80% of the respondents in both of the vig
nettes (1 and 6) that involved environmental harm(s) as well.
Table 2
Percentage of Respondents Indicating Fine
as a Sanction by Vignette
Percent Indicating
"Fine"

Vignette

Harm/Impact

1

Environmental

89.2%
(173)

2

Physical

67.0%
(130)

3

Physical

73.2%
(142)

4

Economic

81.4%
(158)

5

Physical

69.1%
(134)

6

Environmental

80.9%
(157)

7

Economic

84.0%
(163)

(N)

The vignette that had the most respondents indicate that a fine was
an appropriate sanction was Vignette 1 which was the one that in
cluded the polluting of lakes and streams making the water unsafe
for swimming and drinking. Vignette 6 had 80.9% of respondents
(157) indicate a fine as a sanction.

The crimes involving physical

harm did not have as many respondents (73.2% for Vignette 3, 69.1%
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for Vignette 5 and 67.0% for Vignette 2) choosing the fine, but as
we will examine later, these crimes involving physical harm were
penalized more so using a combination of the sanctions.
Respondents who indicated that they would assign a fine in
cluded those respondents who did not speci�y a dollar amount for
the fine, but they included specifics about the fine.

For Vignette

1, 152 respondents indicated a dollar amount, three of those indi
cated a dollar amount plus they included these conditions, •or
amount to clean up if more,• •or however much is necessary to clean
up the water,• and •fine towards clean up.•

Twenty-one respondents

for Vignette 1 did not assign any dollar amount but included these
conditions, •cost of clean up,• costs of clean up plus any medical
costs that arise,• •150% of clean up cost,• and •cost of clean up
plus $1,000,000.•

For Vignette 2, 129 respondents indicated a dol

lar amount when assigning the fine. One of the 129 respondents
indicated a dollar amount plus added the following condition, •fine
to the victim's family.•

One other respondent did not indicate a

dollar amount but specified the fine under this condition, •however
much it takes to fix the machines.•

For Vignette 3, 140 respondents

indicated a dollar amount for the fine. Two of the 140 indicated a
dollar amount plus the following conditions, •per person• and •fine
to victim's family.•

Two other respondents did not assign a dollar

amount but specified the following as a sanction, •150% of profits•
and •gross worth of victims.•

For Vignette 4, 158 respondents indi

cated a dollar amount, one of which added the following condition,
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•if not greater.•

For Vignette 5, 133 respondents specified a dol

lar amount, one of which added, •per person.•

One other respondent

who did not specify a dollar amount specified the fine as •enough to
cover the accident.•

For Vignette 6, 149 respondents specified a

dollar amount, one of which also included that the •fine should go
towards clean up.• Eight respondents indicated that the fine have
certain conditions they are coded as follows; •cost of clean up• and
•150% of clean up costs.• Vignette 7 had 163 respondents indicate a
dollar amount for the fine, there were no other specifications
given.
Examining Table 3 in terms of dollar amounts and seriousness,
I found the most severely sanctioned crime, (Vignette 7) involved
overbilling Medicare for $1 billion dollars, an economic harm.
Fine amounts ranged from $1.00 to $300 billion.
was over $3 billion dollars for this crime.

The average fine

The mode for this crime

was $1 billion dollars, the amount that the government was over
charged.

Vignette 4, the other economic harm crime, was ranked 7th,

it included a company being convicted of knowingly rigging bids and
overcharging the government $1 million dollars.
a mean fine of just over $9 million dollars.

This vignette had

The-second most ser

ious in terms of dollar amount was Vignette 3, a physical harm crime
in which the company was knowingly responsible for four deaths.
mean fine amount for this vignette was over $625 million.

The

Vignette

5 which had twenty people injured because of an unsafe defect, was
ranked 5th in terms of its mean fine amount that was over $18 mil-

44
lion.

Surprisingly, Vignette 2, which included the death of one

employee because the company neglected to repair machinery, was
ranked 6th in terms of mean fine amount which was just over $10
million.

The two vignettes ranked 3rd and 4th in terms of mean

fine amount are the ones that involve corporate crimes that in
clude environmental harms (Vignettes 1 and 6).

These two vig

nettes are close in terms of their mean fine amounts, Vignette 1
had a mean of just over $127 million and Vignette 6 had a mean just
over $126 million.
Table 3
Mean Amount of Fine for Vignettes in Rank Order
Mean Dollar Amount
(Valid N)

Rank

Vignette

Harm/Impact

1

7

Economic

$3,164,908,258
(163)

2

3

Physical

$625,182,093
(140)

3

1

Environmental

$127,110,190
(152)

4

6

Environmental

$126,156,193
(149)

5

5

Physical

$18,268,609
(133)

6

2

Physical

$10,203,478
(129)

7

4

Economic

$9,250,681
(158)
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The Sanction of Probation
As for the sanction of probation (see Table 4), I found that
respondents were less likely to give a sanction of probation than a
fine.

Those who indicated that they would give probation as a sen

tence ranged from 55.7% (for Vignette 7) of the sample to 67% (for
Vignette 2). Vignette 2, which included a crime with a physical
harm, had the most respondents (130) indicate that they would as
sign probation to the company for the crime that it had committed.
Table 4
Percentage of Respondents Indicating Probation as
a. Sanction by Vignette
Percent Indicating
Probation

Vignette

Harm/Impact

1

Environmental

62.4%
(121)

2

Physical

67.0%
(130)

3

Physical

58.2%
(113)

4

Economic

60.8%
(118)

5

Physical

61.3%
(119)

6

Environmental

64.9%
(126)

7

Economic

55.7%
(108)

(N)

-� ..
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The other physical harm vignettes, 3 and 5 had less of the respon
dents assign probation as a sanction.

Vignette 3 had 58.2% and Vig

nette 5 had 61.3% of the respondents indicate that they would assign
probation.

The vignettes that included environmental harms had the

second and third highest percentages indicating that probation was
an appropriate sanction. Vignette 6 had 64.9% of respondents (126)
indicate that they would assign probation as a sanction. Vignette
1, had 62.4% of respondents (121) assign probation as a sanction.
The economic harm vignettes, 4 and 7 had 60.8% and 55.7% of respon
dents choosing probation as a suitable sanction.
The probation sanction, as with the fine sanction, had respon
dents indicating specifics for the sanction and there were those who
chose probation, but did not indicate a number of months.

For Vig

nette 1, 120 respondents specified a number of months that the com
pany had to serve as a sanction. One respondent indicated a number
of months plus noted, •have the company observed and watched for
further implications.•

One respondent did not indicate a number of

months, but felt that the term of probation should be, •until things
are restored to normal.•

For Vignette 2, there were 130 respondents

who specified a number of months, one of which also added to the
sanction, •constant supervision and checks.•

In Vignette 3, 113

respondents specified a number of months and there were no

addi

tions to the sanctions. Vignette 4 had 118 respondents indicate a
number of months; there were no other additions to the sanctions.
For Vignette 5, 118 respondents specified a number of months.

One
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respondent did not specify a number of months, but added that the
probation period should last, •until the trucks are fixed or in
spected.•

For Vignette 6, 123 respondents indicated a specific

number of months.

Three respondents did not specify a number of

months, but added that the probation perio� should last, •until re
stored to normal.• Vignette 7 had 108 respondents that indicated a
number of months; there were no additions to the sanctions.
Examining the mean number of months for the sanction of proba
tion in Table 5, I found that Vignette 3, involving a crime that had
physical harm (four deaths) was the one with the highest mean, 120.3
months.

This can be associated with the finding that Vignette 3 was

also found to be the most serious using the seriousness scale. The
5th ranked vignette was Vignette 5 that had a mean of. 59.9 months
and dealt with serious injuries suffered by twenty people, another
crime with physical harm.

Surprisingly, the 7th ranked vignette was

Vignette 2 that involved the death of an employee; a physical harm.
This vignette's mean was 41.2 months.

The 2nd ranked vignette in

terms of mean number of months for the sanction of probation was
Vignette 6, which had a mean of 93.0. This vignette had to do with
an environmental crime where the company had been-convicted of neg
ligently releasing toxins into the air and creating a problem with
acid rain that destroyed the local habitats of plants and animals.
The 4th ranked vignette for probation was Vignette 1; this had a
mean of 66.5 months and involves an environmental harm where lakes
and streams were polluted. The 3rd ranked vignette was Vignette 7,
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this had a mean of 86.9 months and involved an economic harm where
the company overbilled Medicare and the government was subsequently
overcharged $1 billion.

The 6th ranked vignette was Vignette 4,

which had a mean of 51.5 months. This involved an economic harm;
the government was overcharged $1 million by the company.
Table 5
Mean Number of Months for the Sanction of Probation
in Rank Order
Mean Months of
Probation
(Valid N)

Rank

Vignette

Harm/Impact

1

3

Physical

120.3
(113)

2

6

Environmental

93.0
(123)

3

7

Economic

86.9
(108)

4

1

Environmental

66.5
(120)

5

5

Physical

59.9
(118)

6

4

Economic

51.5
(118)

7

2

Physical

41.2
(130)

The Sanctions Specified by Respondents
Table 6 analyzes the percent of respondents in the sample who
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indicated that another sanction would be appropriate for the crime
and its harm or impact described by the vignette.

It is interesting

to point out that the vignettes are ranked by percentage, but also
by groups in terms of the harm involved.

The first three ranked

vignettes are those that involve physical harms.
Table 6
Percentage of Respondents Indicating Other as a
Sanction in Rank Order

% Indicating Other
(Valid Number)

Rank Vignette

Harm/Impact

1

5

Physical_

42.3%
(82)

2

3

Physical

40.2%
(78)

3

2

Physical

38.7%
(75)

4

6

Environmental

29.4%
(57)

5

1

Environmental

21.6%
(42)

6

7

Economic

14.9%
(29)

7

4

Economic

8.2%
(16)

The second group includes the two environmental harm crimes and the
third group at the bottom of the rankings for those who indicated
•other• as an appropriate sanction, are the economic crimes.

Vig-

so
nette 5 which is ranked 1st with 42.3% (82) of the respondents, had
to do with twenty people being seriously injured. Vignette 3, ranked
2nd with 40.2% (78) of the respondents, involved a crime in which
four people died.

The 3rd ranked Vignette was Vignette 2 with 38.7%

(75) of the respondents indicating that •other• was an appropriate
response.

This particular vignette involved an employee death.

The

4th ranked vignette, involving an environmental harm crime, Vignette
6 had 29.4% (57) of the respondents indicating that •other• was an
appropriate sanction. The 5th ranked vignette was Vignette 1 which
had 21.6% (42) of respondents indicating •other• as a sanction.
Vignette 7 was ranked 6th and had 14.9% (29) respondents specifying
•other• as an appropriate sanction. This vignette involved an eco
nomic harm where the government was overcharged $1 billion.

The 7th

ranked vignette in terms of the percentage of the sample that indi
cated •other• was Vignette 4. It had 8.2% (16) of the respondents
specify a sanction other then fine or probation.
Respondents who indicated •other• as a response were then
asked to specify the sanction that they felt to be appropriate for
the crime and the harm done or impact it had.

Tables 7 through 13

examine the vignettes in rank order based on Table 6. Within each
table is the sanction given by the respondent for •other• and fre
quency of each response.
When examining the data collected for the response to •other•
there were many responses with many different features.

These re

sponses were narrowed to the five categories seen in Table 7.
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Table 7
Specific Sanctions Given by Respondents to Vignette 5
Sanction

Frequency

Compensation/Restitution

so

Product (Recall)

14

Compensation+ Recall

13

Shut Down Company

4

Compensation+ Loss of License

1

This particular vignette involved a company that had been convicted
of negligently testing a new line of trucks which resulted in an un
safe defect causing serious injuries to twenty people.

There were

fifty respondents that indicated that there should be some sort of
•compensation/restitution• given to the victims or victims' fam
ilies.

This category included differing sums of money that respon

dents felt should be given to the victim and or the families, pay
ment of medical bills, pain and suffering costs, and replacement
costs for the vehicle(s). The category of •Product (Recall)• in
cluded fourteen respondents who indicated that the trucks (the pro
duct) should be recalled or taken off of the market.

Thirteen

respondents felt that an appropriate sanction would be to give money
to the injured parties or pay medical bills, and recall the trucks
or take them off of the market, this is what constitutes the cate
gory titled, •compensation+ Product.•

There were four respondents
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that indicated that they would want the company shut down for the
crime that had been committed.

One respondent indicated that the

company should pay for all medical expenses and the company should
lose its license, thus the category •compensation+ Loss of License.•
Table 8 provides information regarding the sanctions specified
by respondents in Vignette 3 under •other.• Twenty-eight respondents
found that a form of •compensation or restitution• was an appro
priate sanction for the crime where four people died due to the com
pany knowingly selling an unsafe, improperly tested pharmaceutical
device.

This category included different sums of money given to the

families of the deceased for restitution, pain and suffering ex
penses; compensation to the families for medical costs, funeral
costs, and payments made to the widow.

Twenty-five respondents in

the sample indicated that an appropriate sanction for the crime and
the harm done would be to shut down the company.

Seven respondents

felt that an appropriate sanction would be for the company to lose
its license.

Six respondents specified a sanction that would have

the product recalled or banned from the market; these are included
in the category of •product.• Five respondents felt that-some form
of compensation (in terms of money to families or medical expenses)
plus recalling the product was the sanction that was suitable for
the crime and harm caused. There were three respondents who speci
fied some form of compensation (funeral costs and damages paid to
families) as well as shutting down the company as specific sanctions
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for Vignette 3.

Two respondents indicated a sanction that included

compensation to the families (funeral costs and paying families for
damages) plus having the company lose its license would be appro
priate.

One respondent indicated that an appropriate sanction would

be to fire those who knowingly allowed the crime to occur. One other
respondent in the sample felt that letters of explanation should be
sent to customers informing them of what occurred.
Table 8
Specific Sanctions Given by Respondents to Vignette 3
Sanction

Frequency

Compensation/Restitution

28

Shut Down Company

25

Loss of License

7

Product

6

Compensation+ Product

5

Compensation+ Shut Down Company

3

Compensation+ Loss of License

2

Fire Those Who Knew

1

Letters of Explanation

1

Table 9 provides us with five categories of sanctions that
respondents indicated when answering •other• to Vignette 2.

This

vignette was one in which a company was convicted of neglecting to
repair machinery and as a result, one employee died.

Fifty respon-
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dents indicated that some form of •restitution or compensation•
should be given to the employee's family and or widow.

Many of the

responses included the following; sums of money that the company
should pay the family/widow along with costs that may be incurred
from a funeral, certain portions of the emp�oyee's salary that should
be paid to the family, and pain and suffering costs.

Nine respon

dents noted that some form of •compensation• to the family or widow
should be paid in addition to •repairing• the machinery.

Eight

respondents felt that an appropriate sanction would be to •shut down
the company•.

For the category of •Inspections/Repair Machinery,•

seven respondents indicated that having the machinery repaired and
inspected was a sanction that would be suitable for the crime.

One

respondent indicated that some form of compensation was due to the
family (in the form of money) along with having the company shut
down.
Table 9
Specific Sanctions Given by Respondents to Vignette 2
Sanction

Frequency

Compensation/Restitution

50

Compensation+ Repair

9

Shut Down Company

8

Inspections/Repair Machinery

7

Compensation+ Repair Machinery

1
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The specific sanctions given by respondents to Vignette 6 were
broken down into eight categories seen in Table 10.

This vignette

involved a company convicted of releasing toxins in the air which
caused the acid rain in the surrounding area to worsen and it also
destroyed local habitats for native plants_and animals.

Thirty-four

respondents felt that a sanction that made the company clean up the
area, restore plant life, help the surrounding area, and pay for
wildlife preservation was appropriate, these were included in the
category of •clean Up.• Thirteen respondents indicated that an ap
propriate sanction would be to shut down the company.

The category

of •community Service• included specific sanctions of three respon
dents who indicated that the company should do community service
with an environmental group, donate money to the clean air fund and
give profits to an environmental group.

The •Prevention Measures•

category included three respondents who felt that the company should
have •full time monitoring of air emissions•, •install devices to
prevent this• and •hire environmental consultants.• One respondent
felt a the specific sanction should be to •clean up and have inspec
tions every three months• this was categorized as •clean Up+ In
spection.• One respondent indicated that the company should be made
to •clean up and shut down•, this was categorized as •clean Up+
Shut Down.• One respondent indicated that an appropriate sanction
would be to have the company pay •damages to the city,• categorized
as •Damages to City.•

One other sanction given by a respondent was

to have the company lose their license, categorized as •Loss of
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License.•
Table 10
Specific Sanctions Given by Respondents to Vignette 6
Sanction

Frequency

Clean Up

34

Shut Down Company

13

Community Service

3

Prevention Measures

3

Clean Up+ Inspection

1

Clean Up+ Shut Down Company

1

Damages to City

1

Loss of License

1

Table 11 displays the categories of specific sanctions for
Vignette 1 which included a company being convicted of dumping toxic
waste into a river, resulting in the pollution of local streams and
lakes making water unsafe for drinking and swimming.

Thirty respon

dents felt that an appropriate sanction would be to have the company
clean up the pollution, •participate in a clean up effort•, •pay for
an alternative water source• and •any additional clean up costs.•
These were categorized as •costs of Cleaning Up.•

Six respondents

felt that an appropriate sanction would be to shut down the company.
Three respondents felt an appropriate sanction would be to have the
company publicize the crime and or make an apology for what it had
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done, this was categorized as •Publicize Crime/Apology.•

One re

spondent indicated that an appropriate sanction would be to •fine
and give probation to those responsible.•

An appropriate sanction

specified by one respondent was to have the company lose its li
cense.

One other respondent felt that having •future disposals

monitored and checked• was an appropriate sanction for the company.
Table 11
Specific Sanctions Given by Respondents to Vignette 1
Sanction

Frequency

Costs of Cleaning Up

30

Shut Down Company

6

Publicize Crime/Apology

3

Fine and Probation to Those Responsible

1

Loss of License

1

Monitoring and Check Future Disposals

1

Table 12 displays the specific sanction given by respondents
for Vignette 7 which had to do with a company being convicted of
knowingly overbilling Medicare that resulted in the government being
overcharged $1 billion.

There were seven respondents that indicated

that the company should lose its license as a sanction for the crime
described in the vignette.

Seven other respondents indicated that

an appropriate sanction would be to have the company pay back the
government.

There were six respondents that felt that shutting down
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the company was an appropriate sanction for the crime described.
Three respondents felt that not allowing the company to contract
with the government was a sanction that was appropriate, this is
categorized as •cannot Contract with Government.•

Three other

respondents felt that the company should make the crime known to
the public and apologize for it, this is categorized as •Public
Admittance/Apology.• There were two respondents who indicated that
the company should •donate to charity• or •give profits to Medicare•
both were placed into the category, •Donate.• One respondent felt
that having the company pay back the government and not allowing
them to contract was an appropriate sanction, categorized as •Pay
Back Government+ Cannot Contract.•
Table 12
Specific Sanctions Given by Respondents to Vignette 7
Sanction

Frequency

Loss of License

7

Pay Back Government

7

Shut Down Company

6

Cannot Contract with Government

3

Public Admittance/Apology

3

Donate

2

Pay Back Government+ Cannot Contract

1
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Table 13 examines the specific responses given by those sur
veyed for Vignette 4 which included a company being convicted of
knowingly rigging bids with competitors on government contracts
that resulted in the government being overcharged $1 million.

Eight

respondents indicated that the company should pay back the govern
ment as its sanction. Four respondents indicated that the company
should not be allowed to contract with the government any longer.
Two respondents indicated that an appropriate sanction would be to
have the company make a public announcement of the crime.

One re

spondent felt that the company should •fire the president (of the
company) and hire new employees• as a sanction, this was categor
ized as •Reorganization.•

One other respondent felt that the com

pany should be shut down for the crime that it committed and its
harm.
Table 13
Specific Sanctions Given by Respondents for Vignette 4
Sanction

Frequency

Pay Back Government

8

Cannot Contract with Government

4

Public Announcement

2

Reorganization

1

Shut Down Company

1
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The Notion of Punitiveness in Sanctioning
After examining each of the sanctions given, I decided to com
bine and recode the sanctions to see how many were given for each
vignette.

Respondents did not limit themselves to just one san

ction in the form of fine or probation or o·ther.

Many respondents

gave multiple parts to the sanction, whether it be a fine and proba
tion, fine and other, probation and other or even all three san
ctions.

The idea that one sanction was not enough contributes to

the punitive nature of the respondent in judging the crime and its
harm.

If an individual answered •yes• to only one of the sanctions

(fine, probation or other), the value given was 1. If the respondent
answered •yes• to two of the three sanctions, the value given was 2.
If all three sanctions were answered, the value given was 3.
. sanction was given, the value is 0.

If no

The proceeding section will

view the vignettes in rank order for each of the sanction categor
ies; •no sanction,• •one sanction,• •two sanctions• or •three sanc
tions.•
Most respondents (over 92% for each vignette) gave some form
of sanction as displayed in Table 14.

The vignettes that involved

an environmental crime (1 and 6) were interesting in the percentage
of respondents who decided not to give a sanction.

For Vignette 1,

only 1.0% of the respondents (2) did not indicate some form of san
ction. Vignette 6 only had 4.6% of the respondents (9) not give a
sanction.

For respondents giving only one sanction, they were more

inclined to do so for Vignettes 4 and 7 (39.7% and 35.6%) which in-
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eluded crimes with economic harms. At least 50% or more of the
respondents gave two sanctions to all of the vignettes.
Table 14
Percentage of Respondents who Indicated No Sanction,
One Sanction, Two Sanctions or All Three Sanctions
for Each Vignet"te
No
Sanction

1

2

Vignette

Harm/Impact

1

Environmental

1.0%
(2)

34.5%
(67)

54.6%
(106)

9.8%
(19)

2

Physical

7.2%
(14)

27.8%
(54)

50.0%
(97)

14.9%
(29)

3

Physical

5.2%
(10)

30.9
(60)

51.0%
(99)

12.9%
(25)

4

Economic

5.7%
(11)

39.7%
(77)

53.1%
(103)

1.5%

5

Physical

4.1%

31.4%
(61)

52.1%
(101)

12.4%
(24)

6

Environmental

4.6%
(9)

25.8%
(50)

59.3%
(115)

10.3%
(20)

7

Economic

7.2%
(14)

35.6%
(69)

52.6%
(102)

4.6%

(8)

Sanction Sanctions Sanctions

(3 )

(9)

Approximately 59% (59.3) of the respondents gave two sanctions
to Vignette 6 which included a crime with an environmental crime,
this was the highest percentage of respondents indicating two sanc
tions;

The second highest in terms of those respondents giving two

sanctions was Vignette 1 with 54.6% of respondents giving two sanc
tions.

This vignette also includes an environmental harm.

I also
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examined the most sanctions that can be given, 3.

In doing so, ·r

found that the top three in terms of respondents choosing all three
sanctions, were the vignettes that included physical harms.

They

were Vignettes 2, 3 and 5. Vignette 2 was the highest with 14.9% of
the respondents (29) indicating that a fine, a term of probation and
another sanction were all appropriate sanctions for the crime de
scribed in the vignette. Vignette 3 was the second highest for those
respondents indicating all three sanctions. Approximately 13% (12.9)
of the respondents (25) felt that all three sanctions would be the
suitable sanction.

The third highest vignette in terms of receiv

ing all three sanctions was Vignette 5 which had 12.4% of the re
spondents (24) answering this way.

Environmental crimes followed

close behind the physical crimes in receiving all three sanctions.
Vignettes 6 and 1 had 10.3% and 9.8% of respondents (20 and 19)
indicating that all three sanctions were appropriate.

The economic

crime vignettes had the lowest percentage of respondents indicating
that all three sanctions were appropriate.

For Vignette 7, only

4.6% of respondents (9) indicated all three sanctions.

For Vignette

4, only 1.5% of respondents (3) indicated all three sanctions.

CHAPTER IV
INTERPRETATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
This chapter interprets the survey findings presented in the
previous chapter.

It must be noted that these research findings and

interpretations may only be generalized to the sample population's
perceptions and not to students in general, or the public.

Some

concluding thoughts and suggestions for further research will also
be included.
This chapter will attempt to answer the research questions
formulated in Chapter I.
1.

The questions were:

What types of sentences/sanctions are specified by the

respondents?
2.

What types of sentences/sanctions are most commonly used

by the respondents?
3.

Which types of corporate crime receive the harshest sen

tences/sanctions from respondents?
4.

What corporate crimes are ranked as the most serious?

5.

What are the possible reasons (within the vignette) for

these sentences/sanctions?
6.

How else can we measure the seriousness of an offense?
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Research Question #l
The first question concerns the types of sentences/sanctions
other than fine and probation that were specified by the respond
ents.
to 13.

These specific sentences/sanctions are described in Tables 7
The most sanctions specified by res·pondents were for Vig

nettes 2, 3, and 5.
harms/impacts.

These crimes all have to do with physical

Vignette 5 which involved twenty people being ser

iously injured, had the most respondents specify sanctions.

It ap

pears as though many of the sanctions that were specified are in
response to the injuries suffered by the twenty people.

This was

confirmed when I looked at.the specifics of the sanctions (as seen
in Table 7).

Fifty of the respondents felt that some sort of re

stitution or compensation was due to the victims and or their fam
ilies.

The respondents seemed to be focused on making sure that

the victims were compensated in terms of money from the company to
make up for the harm done.

I find this extremely interesting in

that respondents were concerned about the victims in this manner.
This sanction may not necessarily be •harsh• or •tough• on the com
pany, but it is appropriate in the views of the respondents.

The

compensation or restitution may add up to a lot of money depending
on the extent of the injuries.

Fourteen other respondents for Vig

nette 5 felt that the victims should receive compensation or re
stitution, but they added another sanction as well.

One respondent

felt that the victims should be compensated plus have the company
lose its license, a more severe penalty than just compensation.
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Thirteen respondents felt compensation was necessary along with
having the trucks pulled off the market or recalled.
In Vignette 3, the other sanctions specified were much like
the ones for Vignette 5.

There were many respondents who felt that

compensating the victims was an appropriate sanction, but there were
also many that felt another sanction should be imposed.
sanction of interest was shutting down the company.

The other

A death penalty

for the company is the severest of all penalties for a corporation.
Respondents in all seven vignettes gave this particular sanction.
Vignette 3 had the most respondents indicate this sanction.

This

particular vignette had to do with four people dying because of an
unsafe, improperly tested pharmaceutical device.

This vignette was

also ranked as the most serious in terms of the mean seriousness.
Shutting down a company is highly unlikely to occur given the power
and influence of the corporation in the real world.

The respondents

seem to have strong feelings that it could be applied and is reason
able given the circumstances of the crime.
ction is a result of the harm done.

I believe that this san

Environmental crimes such as

the one described in Vignette 6 also received this penalty.

Thir

teen respondents felt that the company that destroyed the habitats
of plants and animals should also be shut down.

This sanction was

not just applied to one certain type of crime, but to all (physical,
environmental and economic).
Other sanctions specified by respondents were influenced in
large part by the details of the crime including the impact.

For
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instance, in Vignette 2, the company neglected to repair machinery
and the respondents reflected this in the specific sanction by spe
cifying that the machinery should be repaired.

Respondents indi

cated that the machinery should be repaired and or inspected.

I be

lieve that this crime may have led respondents to envision them
selves as workers who had to work on the machinery.

They would not

want to have to work on machines that were unsafe.

Another example

can be seen with Vignettes 1 and 6, where the companies had committed
an environmental harm crime.

Respondents felt that the costs of

clean up should be the responsibility of the company.

The respon

dents seem to be focused on the environment getting the attention
needed to ensure a safe eco-system.

I believe that the respondents

may have been thinking past the crime phase into predicting what may
happen if the environment is not cleaned up properly. In response to
Vignettes 4 and 7, where companies committed an economic harm crime,
the sentences specified were directed towards the companies paying
back the government. This sanction is a result of the dollar amounts
involved.

There were not many specific sanctions for these two

vignettes and this may be the result of the lack of any real harm
caused besides monetary loss which is more easily recovered.
Research Question #2
The most commonly used sanction by respondents was the fine
(see Table 2).

The lowest number of respondents giving a fine as a

sanction was for Vignette 2, where 67% indicated a fine was appro-
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priate.

The highest percentage of respondents indicating that a

fine was appropriate was for Vignette 1 (89.2%).

Only 21 respond

ents (10.8%) did not assign a fine for this vignette.

Cohen (1989)

found that "89% of the 288 corporate offenders he studied were
fined" (p. 610).

The average fine in Cohen's study was "a little

over $50,000" (p. 611).

It is interesting that the courts seem to

fine the companies as often as the respondents do in this study.
This seems to be an appropriate sanction given the financial nature
of the corporation.

However, a respondent may be content to stipu

late the most generally appropriate sanction, but the omission of
other sanctions is not necessarily a rejection of them.

In Cohen's

study, the mean amount of the fine is small compared with the mean
fine amounts for the vignettes in this study (see Table 3).

The

respondents, faced with only seven corporate crimes with specific
harms, gave much higher fines than is usual in the federal courts.
The 288 corporate offenders in Cohen's study may not have committed
as serious offenses as described in the vignettes, but the fact that
the fine is so low is interesting when examining the dollar amounts
given in this study.

The fines levied by the respondents are likely

based upon the harm being done by the company.

In Vignette 7 for

example, the mean fine amount was three times the amount the company
overcharged the government.

The dollar amount here is extremely high

at $1 billion and this directly affected the way respondents an
swered.

Frank et al. (1989) found that as the physical and economic

harm goes up, sanctions are increased, this seems to be echoed in
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this study.

I believe that the respondents felt it much easier to

assign a dollar amount to the crimes where a dollar amount was a
part of the harm done.

For the environmental harm and physical harm

crimes, the dollar amount may not have been as easy to calculate.
How much does a human life cost? If we look at the mean fine amount
given for Vignette 3, over $600 million, and divided by four (the
number of deaths) then we could say that respondents felt on average
that a life was worth over $150 million.

However, this is not the

case when looking at Vignette 2 (one death occurring) where the
average fine was over $10 million.

I feel that respondents do not

have a formula for the dollar amount to assign on a physical harm,
rather they randomly select a dollar amount that they feel would be
appropriate for the company, the crime committed and the harm done.
It is interesting to note that the environmental harm crimes were
ranked 3rd and 4th in terms of mean fine amount ($127 and $126 mil
lion).

These fine amounts are over $25 million more than what the

Exxon Corporation received as part of its sentence in the 1989 oil
spill in Alaska.

So we can see that respondents may in fact be more

severe than federal courts in sentencing corporate offenders.

This

however, is not the focus of this particular study; it does however
raise an interesting research question, would respondents give a
higher or lower fine to a corporation as compared to the federal
courts?
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Research Questions #3 and #6
In answering research question #3, it is difficult not to
answer #6 as well.

To understand what the harshest sentences/san

ctions are, it must be defined what harshest actually means.

In

Chapter IV, I referred to punitiveness as a·way in which we can re
code all three sanctions (fine, probation and other) to see how many
The maximum number of sanctions that

were given for each vignette.

can be assigned in this survey is three.

Respondents who indicate

all three sanctions are giving the harshest sanction possible, a
fine with a dollar amount, probation with number of months and an
other sanction that is specified.

A large fine amount may be harsh

for some respondents, but a long term of probation may be for others.
As was said previously, just because respondents chose one sanction
which they feel is most appropriate, this does not mean that they
would reject another sanction.
conducting future research.

This is important to remember when

Respondents may in fact chose other

sanctions if they know what other sanctions are possible.

If re

spondents could chose between a fine, probation and or specified
sanctions like those discussed in research question #l, they may be
even harsher. Some harsh sanctions have already been discussed in
answering research question #l.

Shutting down a company can be the

harshest of all sanctions, but this too can be compounded, some re
spondents included a fine along with shutting down the company.

For

the purposes of this study, I am viewing the responses of all three
sanctions as the harshest.

This means if they indicated a fine,
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probation and specified another sanction, this is the harshest, re
gardless of what the fine amount was, the term of probation was and
the sanction specified.
This leads me to discuss another way that seriousness can be
measured.

Measuring seriousness is a complex issue and needs to be

examined more closely than this study attempts to do.

There are a

number of factors for respondents to consider when assessing a crime
and its seriousness.
crime.

First, there needs to be a clearly defined

Second, the offender must be described at length.

the consequences of the crime must also be clearly stated.

Finally,
This

will enable respondents to assess the offense in a more complete and
effective manner.

I have not really dealt with the nature of the

companies involved in these crimes, but I have taken a close look at
the crime and the harm or impact that it has had.

These are things

that judges and juries examine when deciding the sentence of an of
fender whether it is an individual or a corporation.

Dealing with a

corporation (in a legal sense) is a complex issue in regards to its
prior record, size and net worth all of which could be considered
when assigning a sanction.

Using a Likert scale is only one way to

measure the seriousness of an offense.

This scale leaves us with a

question as to what is serious? How serious is it?

Having respon

dents choose a sanction is a way in which we can better understand
the seriousness from a different perspective.
but a step in the right direction.

It is not complete,

There is a need to assess what

sanctions will be more punishing to a corporation than others.

Is a
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fine more serious than probation? ls shutting down the company the
most serious? Some would agree with this, others would feel that it
is a sanction that is unreasonable and unrealistic, but the fact re
mains that many respondents in this survey felt it was appropriate.
In terms of the seriousness as I have defined it (represented
in Table 14), the crimes that are the most serious are those which
involve a physical harm (Vignettes 2, 3 and 5).

This follows Sch

rager and Short's (1980) analysis that there is a •high degree of
public concern for illegal actions with serious adverse physical im
pact• (p. 27).

Respondents felt that not only were a fine and proba

tion appropriate, but so too was another specified sanction.

The

highest percentage of respondents felt that the physical harm crimes
deserved all three sanctions.

The environmental harm crimes (Vig

nettes 1 and 6) were the next highest in terms of percent of respon
dents indicating all three sanctions.

This is an important factor

because these crimes have not been studied and it has been difficult
to hypothesize as to where they may fit in to the overall serious
ness.

It has been discussed in research question #l what sanctions

were specified by respondents.

Because of the seriousness of the

harms involved in the vignettes, the more sanctions that are needed
to adequately punish a company.

Gibbons (1969) found variability

among citizens in the degree of punishment given to specific crimes,
this study seems to differ from this conclusion.

While there was

some degree of variability in terms of dollar amount or number of
months on probation, the number of sanctions selected appear to be
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consistent across all vignettes with a majority selecting two san
ctions to be imposed.
Research Question #4
Other criminologists have attempted to answer how serious cer
tain types of traditional crimes are viewed.

I was curious to see

if the physical harm crimes would be the most serious given the na
ture of the impact that they had upon the victims.

As can be seen

in Table 1, those vignettes that included death (2 and 3) were rank
ed 1st and 2nd after which came the environmental harm crimes ranked
3rd and 4th.

In Rossi et al. (1974), the three corporate offenses

that included the death of an individual were ranked behind the of
fense that included the manufacturing and selling of drugs that were
harmful to users.

This study differs from Rossi et al. in terms of

where the offenses that include death are located.

Surprisingly the

other physical harm Vignette (5) was ranked 5th behind the environ
mental harm crimes.

The reason I found this surprising was the phy

sical harm crimes involved people, that I felt the respondents would
relate to.

Vignette 3, in which four people died, had to do with a

pharmaceutical device which could have been anything from an IUD to
an inhaler.

The idea of a pharmaceutical company being a company

you are trusting with your health, may have been shattered with the
notion that people could die from a device that was not properly
tested.

As Friedrichs (1996) notes,

the common element in all of these pharmaceutical product
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cases was that the corporations put the pursuit of profits
ahead of scrupulous concern for the health and safety of their
users. Despite the fines, civil damages, and negative publi
city experienced by the pharmaceutical companies, they have
typically suffered no lasting damage and have continued to
operate profitably. (p. 77)
The environmental harm crimes may have been perceived more serious
due to their potential for future harms.

Iri Vignette 1, the local

streams and lakes were polluted and this could result in physical
harm if people did drink or swim in the water.

In Vignette 6, the

physical harm was directed towards plants and animals, not humans.
It is difficult to compare these environmental crimes to any other
studies on crime seriousness because these types are continually
left out.

I believe that respondents may have perceived this crime

as serious because acid rain may have long term effects on humans.
Friedrichs (1996) points out that •there has in fact been a histor
ical reluctance to prosecute corporate environmental cases• (p. 309).
This reluctance may have been known by the respondents and perceived
as problematic, therefore they assigned a high seriousness score to
the crimes.

Friedrichs also points out that •support for more vig

orous prosecution of environmental crimes is growing• (p. 309). This
may coincide with the way environmental crimes are seen by the pub
lic.

Friedrichs goes on to point out, •the overall harmful conse

quences of such practices (referring to pollution) for the health of
Americans seem evident to many observers• (p. 71).

Events like

Earth Day and recycling may also bring to light the problems of the
environment.

Media portrayals of pollution (Exxon Valdez) can also

contribute to the way in which respondents feel about the serious-

]4
ness of such crimes.
As was seen in Chapter II, studies by Rossi et al. (1974),
McCleary et al. (1981) and Cullen et al. (1982) did not focus on
organizational crimes, but did have certain crimes that could be
considered corporate or organizational off�nses.

These offenses

were broken into two distinct categories; economic and physical.

In

all three studies, the physical harm crimes were found to have a
higher seriousness score than economic crimes.
same thing.

This study finds,the

This finding is consistent with what Schrager and Short

(1980) found when examining the organizational type crimes in Rossi
et al. (1974).

Economic harm crimes are not perceived as serious as

physical harm crimes.

As Sanford Kadish (1963) points out,

these perceptions require distinguishing and reasoning pro
cesses that are not normal governors of the passion of moral
disapproval, and are not dramatically obvious to a public long
conditioned to responding approvingly to the production of
profit through business shrewdness, especially in the absence
of live and visible victims. (p. 436)
People may recognize the fact that companies need to make profits,
but it should not have physical costs.

There is a

consensus among

respondents in all of these studies including this one.

The one

main factor in all of them is the harm done by the offender.

More

needs to be done in terms of analyzing environmental crimes because
corporations are the world's largest polluters and the effects of
pollution can be felt in the ecological system and by humans that
may suffer physically from the pollution long after it has been
cleaned up.
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Research Question #5
Many reasons may be present for the sentences that were given
by the respondents.

Respondents may have focused in on the act it

self, the harm done, or they may have envisioned something in the
vignette that was not fully explained.

The.main reason that has

continually been focused on is the type of harm involved in the
vignettes.
economic.

There are three main types, physical, environmental, and
Another aspect of the vignettes that may have played a

part is the culpability of the company; there were three levels of
this, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently.

These were not con

trolled for in the study and did not seem to have any affect on the
seriousness or sanctions given to the crimes.

Frank et al. (1989)

concluded, •there is a tendency for punitiveness to be positively
associated with the level of harm and though not quite as consistent,
with the clarity of culpability• (p. 155).

The punitiveness did

come from the differing levels of harm included in the vignettes.
The harms in this study were the main predictors of the seriousness
scores and sanctions specified by the respondents.

It becomes clear

when examining research question #l how much the levels of harm af
fect the sanctions given. The specified sanctions had a direct rela
tion with the intricacies of the vignette. Take for instance, the
fact that there were consumer products in Vignettes 3 and 5.

Some

respondents referred to the product in some manner when assigning a
specific sanction (recalling the product).

The harm done was also a

concern of respondents as is seen in all of the physical harm crime
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Vignettes (2, 3 and 5) where there was a concern for the victims
receiving some form of compensation.
ctioned most often with a fine.
being done.

The economic crimes were san

This seems to relate to the harm

It is clearly pointed out when viewing the mode of the

fine for Vignette 4 and 7.

The most common dollar amount assigned

for a sanction was the same dollar.amount that was lost.

The nature

of the offender has a lot to do with the sanctions given.

A corpor

ation cannot be imprisoned so other sanctions are used as punishment.
I did not include any information about the company's prior criminal
history, but there may be a need for this in future research seeing
that it can play a role in assigning sanctions. The size of the com
pany is another factor that could play a role.

Some transnational

companies worth billions of dollars can shrug off a fine of $100 mil
lion whereas a local company that employs fifty workers may not be
able to do so and a fine of such proportion could be its demise.

In

any event, the levels of harm involved.in the vignettes seem to have
the biggest influence on how respondents assigned penalties.
Summary and Conclusions
Even though there appears to be some consensus among those
respondents specifying sanctions, there still remains the fact that
these sanctions may never be imposed or enforced even if a much
larger sample of the society was to call for such sanctions.

Thomas

et al. (1976) concluded that the consensus model provided more accu
rate predictions of the seriousness in the offenses they studied
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(most of which were traditional street crimes).

This study cannot

conclude the same given the nature of corporate crime where the ori
gins of law differ in terms of those who create it.

Even if consen

sus exists, there remains the fact that the respondents do not re
present those in power who actually make the decisions in lawmaking.
If lawmakers were more focused on the offenses of corporations and
laws governing them, it may be due to a temporary outcry from the
public that needs to be taken care of to maintain some order.

Take

for instance the Sherman Antitrust Act, Chambliss and Seidman (1971)
state that the anti-trust laws •were tantamount to giving up a room
in the basement in order to save the castle• (p. 66).
The consensus model fails to provide an explanation as to how
the decision-making process is affected by those with power and spe
cial interests.

Following a conflict perspective, even if the laws

are passed condemning certain corporate activities, there still re
mains the process of enforcing the laws, obtaining convictions, and
actually imposing these sanctions, all of which maybe influenced by
interest groups.

These interest groups may be concerned with drugs

or violence and not corporate crimes.

The recent war on drugs has

lawmakers supporting stiffer penalties for those individual crim
inals that are convicted of drug offenses.

This focus is what is

seen as important in the current state of affairs.
This study investigated the perceptions of students at Western
Michigan University.

The quantitative findings provide great in

sight into the research questions.

For example, understanding what
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types of sanctions were specified most by respondents when sentenc
ing a company.

Fines were used most often in each vignette as an

appropriate sentence for the company.

Another example where the

quantitative findings were useful was in answering the research
question about what corporate crimes were ranked the most serious by
respondents.

Analyzing the mean scores for each vignette provided

me with the data that showed those crimes involving death were con
sidered the most serious.
Analyzing the qualitative data proved interesting in terms of
understanding what respondents felt about other sanctions.

Many of

the sanctions specified by the respondents may have policy implica
tions. There is support for shutting down companies that commit phy
sical harm crimes.

This support may be the start of a public outcry

whereby lawmakers are made to respond to what the public demands.
Some of the other sanctions may also be the way other people, not
surveyed are feeling, this in turn could lead to stronger enforce
ment of the laws or a change in the current ones.
A major weakness of this study is the fact that it is diffi
cult to really assess the seriousness of the punishments.

There is

some vagueness as to what really affects corporations in terms of
punishment.

There is no doubt that shutting down the company would

be the worst punishment, but it is hard to figure how a fine or
probation would affect the company.

This may leave some respondents

to guess at what the sanction will do to the company.

Another weak

ness is that the company has already been put on trial and convict-
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ed.
ates.

This is not how the real criminal justice system usually oper
Companies are usually not even put on trial or even convicted

of a crime.

If they even go to trial, a plea is usually negotiated

whereby the company will not be sanctioned as harshly had they gone
through a lengthy, costly trial.
state play a major role.

This is where the interests of the

The state must pull together costly re

sources to successfully prosecute a company.

Even if the public de

mands a trial, it may be in the best interest of the state to cut
costs and negotiate a plea.
Respondents may have been influenced when specifying sanctions
by the role they play in society.

They may be a consumer, an em

ployee, a husband/wife, a concerned citizen, or a taxpayer all of
which can affect their view about crime and how they would sanction
the party responsible.

Due to time constraints in this study, these

issues were not investigated.

More questions may need to be raised

about respondents and their characteristics to gain this type of
information.

This may be an important factor to examine in future

research.
One of the strengths of this study is the fact that its focus
is on corporate crimes.

Rossi et al. (1974) did not examine who

the offender was when stating the offenses in their study.
unclear who the offender was.
fied in each vignette.

It was

In this study, a company is identi

Another strength is that respondents were

able to make a better judgment since the vignettes described what
the actual impact of the crime was.

This study also examines en-
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vironmental crimes, which have not been examined by previous stu
dies.

In this study, there did seem to be a concern by respondents

about these offenses.

This is a point for future research.

There

may need to be a closer examination of how the public feels about
the environment, the crimes against it, and why they feel the way
that they do.

Finally, another strength of this study is that it

attempts to expand the scope of crime seriousness to include san
ctions as a factor in measurement.

Using a Likert scale has been

the sole method used in previous studies, but this fails to provide
us with a practical response to a crime.

A practical response would

be one that is similar to a real court setting. Sentences are handed
down, not numbers on a scale.
In conclusion, this study has shed new light on what consti
tutes seriousness and how it can be measured.

Respondents showed a

concern for corporate crime and the harm involved in the crime(s).
There remains more research to be done in terms of how the public's
perceptions and attitudes can affect law-making policy.

This may

assist those interested in corporate and white-collar crime in the
debate between consensus and conflict theories.
on only a small portion of this debate.

This study touches
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Please read the following seven vignettes and then apply the
sentence/sanction that you believe to be the most appropriate.

If

you choose to give the corporation a fine, please specify how much
in U.S. dollars.

If you choose a sentence of probation please

specify how long in terms of months.

If yo� choose other, please

explain ,the sentence/sanction that you believe is appropriate.
After you have ,done that, to determine how serious you feel the
crime was, please circle a number from 1 to 7, 1 being not serious
and 7 being very serious.

Please keep in mind that the corporation

itself cannot be imprisoned.
VIGNETTES
1.

Company ABC has been convicted of recklessly dumping toxic
waste into the Jones River. As a result, local streams and
lakes were polluted (along with the river), making them unsafe
for swimming and drinking water.
A.
B.

c.

---------------

Fine: $ Amount
Probation: Number of Months-------Other (Please Explain)___________

Using the scale, please circle ONE number to determine how
serious you feel the crime is:

1
2
Not Serious

3

5
4
Somewhat Serious

6
Very Serious
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2.

Company PQR has been convicted of neglecting to repair
machinery. As a result, one employee died.
A.
B.

c.

--------------

Fine: $ Amount
Probation: Number of Months-------Other (Please Explain) -----------

Using the scale, please circle ONE number to determine how
serious you feel the crime is:
2
1
Not Serious

3.

3

4
5
Somewhat Serious

6
7
Very Serious

Company JKL has been convicted of knowingly selling an unsafe,
improperly tested pharmaceutical device that has caused the
deaths of four people.
A.
B.

c.

--------------

Fine: $ Amount
Probation: Number of Months-------Other (Please Explain) ___________

Using the scale, please circle ONE number to determine how
serious you feel the crime is:
2
1
Not Serious

4.

3

4
5
Somewhat Serious

6
7
Very Serious

Company GHI has been convicted of knowingly rigging bids with
competitors for government contracts. As a result, the
government was overcharged $1,000,000.
A.
B.

c.

--------------

Fine: $ Amount
Probation: Number of Months-------Other (Please Explain) ___________

Using the scale, please circle ONE number to determine how
serious you feel the crime is:
2
1
Not Serious

3

4
5
Somewhat Serious

6
7
Very Serious
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5.

Company MNO has been convicted of negligently testing a new
line of trucks before putting them on the market. As a
result of an unsafe defect, twenty people suffered serious
injuries in accidents where they were driving this new truck.
A.
B.
c.

Fine: $ Amount--------------Probation: Number of Months-------Other (Please Explain) ___________

Using the scale, please circle ONE number to determine how
serious you feel the crime is:
2
1
Not Serious

6.

3

4

5

Somewhat Serious

6

7

Very Serious

Company DEF has been convicted of negligently releasing toxins
into the air. As a result, acid rain in the surrounding areas
worsened and the local habitats for native plants and animals
were destroyed.
A.
B.

c.

---------------

Fine: $ Amount
Probation: Number of Months-------Other (Please Explain) ___________

Using the scale, please circle ONE number to determine how
serious you feel the crime is:
2
1
Not Serious

7.

3

4
5
Somewhat Serious

6
7
Very Serious

Company STU has been convicted of knowingly overbilling Medi
care. As a result, the government was overcharged
$1,000,000,000.
A.
B.
C.

---------------

Fine: $ Amount
Probation: Number of Months________
Other (Please Explain) __________

Using the scale, please circle ONE number to determine how
serious you feel the crime is:
1
2
Not Serious

3

4
5
Somewhat Serious

6
7
Very Serious
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DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
Are you

1. Male
2. Female

What was your age on your last birthday?
What is your racial group that best describes you?
A.
African American/Black
B.
White/Caucasian
C.
Hispanic
Native American
D.
E.
Asian
F.
Other
What was your total current household income last year before taxes?
A.

B.

C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.

Under $9,999
$10,000 To $19,999
$20,000 To $29,999
$30,000 To $39,999
$40,000 To $49,999
$50,000 To $59,999
$60,000 To $69,999
Over $70,000

Are you currently a:
A.
B.
C.
D.

Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior

What is your major?
What is your intended occupation when you graduate?

Thank you for your participation.
confidential.

All answers are completely
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